Post by account_disabled on Jan 31, 2024 2:32:44 GMT -6
Prigozhin 's "rud" has triggered interpretations and even premature judgments about Russia's immediate future. In general, governments have been more cautious than the media and their sources of authority (academics, supposed experts on how the Kremlin works, former senior officials or disillusioned officials). Caution or simple experience from four decades of professional performance advise me not to be too daring. The dominant opinion is that Putin has seen his authority shaken (Blinken dixit ) with the plan of the head of the mercenaries Wagner and the weak response he received first from the Army and then from the Kremlin itself, allowing him to escape and take refuge in Belarus, after the “mediation” by autocrat Lukashenko . Seen through Western eyes, what happened at the end of June has been a disaster for the Russian president.
But for some time now, everything that happens in Russia is perceived with an air of catastrophe, of a delayed time bomb. The judgments move between recurrent moral judgments and negative evaluations about the Phone Number Database conduct and execution of the campaign. There are many reasons for this. But the negative tends to be exaggerated and everything that is favorable to the interests of the Russian regime is ignored. None of this is new. The West has not played a great role in analyzing, understanding and anticipating events in Russia at least since Gorbachev 's arrival at the top of the communist hierarchy . Opinions about the 7th Secretary General of the CPSU ranged from relative surprise at a generational change that seemed never going to occur and a certain enthusiasm when the Soviet leader began to spread his openness creed left and right.
Gorbachev was known before his arrival at the top of the Kremlin, among other things because of his trip to London, when he was the foreboding dolphin. Thatcher blessed him with one of her shopkeeper's daughter phrases: “you can do business with this man.” The West has not played a great role in analyzing, understanding and anticipating events in Russia at least since the arrival of Gorbachev That “coming out” was the beginning of a change in the Western media paradigm about the USSR. A sympathetic leader in the making promised changes and liked to show them off and show off, thinking more about foreign audiences than about his own people. At the end of 1990, when his policy of structural reforms ( perestroika ) and openness ( glasnost ) was already beginning to run aground, I made a professional trip to Moscow, with a TVE team.
But for some time now, everything that happens in Russia is perceived with an air of catastrophe, of a delayed time bomb. The judgments move between recurrent moral judgments and negative evaluations about the Phone Number Database conduct and execution of the campaign. There are many reasons for this. But the negative tends to be exaggerated and everything that is favorable to the interests of the Russian regime is ignored. None of this is new. The West has not played a great role in analyzing, understanding and anticipating events in Russia at least since Gorbachev 's arrival at the top of the communist hierarchy . Opinions about the 7th Secretary General of the CPSU ranged from relative surprise at a generational change that seemed never going to occur and a certain enthusiasm when the Soviet leader began to spread his openness creed left and right.
Gorbachev was known before his arrival at the top of the Kremlin, among other things because of his trip to London, when he was the foreboding dolphin. Thatcher blessed him with one of her shopkeeper's daughter phrases: “you can do business with this man.” The West has not played a great role in analyzing, understanding and anticipating events in Russia at least since the arrival of Gorbachev That “coming out” was the beginning of a change in the Western media paradigm about the USSR. A sympathetic leader in the making promised changes and liked to show them off and show off, thinking more about foreign audiences than about his own people. At the end of 1990, when his policy of structural reforms ( perestroika ) and openness ( glasnost ) was already beginning to run aground, I made a professional trip to Moscow, with a TVE team.